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The role of communication in a pandemic emergency is crucial because it contributes to the 
spread of collective interpretations of the crisis that drive community responses. Based on 
the social representations’ theory approach, and specifically relying on the notions of 
collective symbolic coping and polemical social representations, the study presents 10 
country-based case studies of public communication with the aim of exploring the social 
representations of COVID-19 during the first wave of the outbreak. Multiple 
communication sources from 10 countries in 5 geo-cultural contexts (Europe, North 
America, Latin America, Asia, Africa) were selected and analyzed: institutional websites; 
international/national/local newspapers and news channels; national/international press 
agencies; and social media platforms. Results highlighted the prevalence of multivocality 
and polemical social representations, along with outgroup blaming and stigmatization 
processes, the use of military and naturalistic metaphors, antinomies, and discourse 
polarization. Implications for effective public communication in crisis management are 
discussed. 
 





1. Introduction  
 
The COVID-19 outbreak has gone hand in hand with an ‘infodemic’, an epidemic of 
information that combines facts, speculations, and fake news. This infodemic has affected all 
communication domains: not only media and social media networks, but also institutional 
systems (Lovari et al., 2020). Indeed, a recent international study (Brennen et al., 2020) revealed 
that prominent public figures also can contribute to spreading misinformation; even though they 
may be very few, their influence is amplified to the extent their statements are echoed on social 
media platforms. 
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The role of communication in a pandemic crisis is crucial. At the community level it is 
apparent that the key issue in crisis management is community response: this response is driven 
by collective interpretative processes that shape our understanding of what the disease is, where 
it comes from, who is responsible for spreading and combating it, and whether experts and 
institutions are reliable. According to lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski et al., 2010), people 
shape their knowledge based on both internal and external social sources. Among the latter, and 
increasingly so in times of uncertainty like crises, it is political leaders, experts, and news 
channels that can serve as epistemic authorities. During emergencies and crises, institutional 
figures constantly engage in communication efforts to influence people’s behavior (MacLoad, 
2014, 2015). Indeed, how major social objects – and the COVID-19 pandemic is certainly one 
of this kind – are framed and represented in institutional speeches, political debate, scientific 
discourse, media messages and social media conversations orients people’s thoughts, feelings 
and behaviors. In turn, people actively contribute to supporting such representations through 
private communication. This reciprocal influence and interconnection are a postulate at the heart 
of social representations theory (SRT) (Moscovici, 2000), based on the primary role that 
communication plays in the production and reproduction of collective sensemaking processes.  
In this paper, we specifically rely on two notions that can be traced back to the broader SRT 
theoretical framework, namely, the notion of symbolic coping (Wagner et al., 2002) and the 
distinction between different types of social representations (i.e., hegemonic, emancipated, and 
polemical, Moscovici, 1988). These two concepts are the interpretive grids that guide our 
analysis of public communication in ten different countries. The aim of such analysis is to 
demonstrate that in the first wave of the contagion the collective symbolic coping activity was 
frozen in a state of ‘divergence’, characterized by the existence of multiple, antinomical, 
polemical social representation of the COVID-19 outbreak.  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework  
 
SRT (de Rosa, 2013, 2019; de Rosa et al., 2018, Emiliani & Palmonari, 2019; Jodelet, 1989, 
2015; Lo Monaco et al., 2016; Moscovici, 1961/76, 2000, 2001; Sammut et al., 2015) highlights 
how the genesis of the public understanding of threatening and disruptive events, their emotional 
impact, the evocation of past traumatic events and the shaping of collective memories are forged 
by and lie in communicative processes, which are at the same time the source and the target of 
social knowledge, the infrastructure for creating semiotic resources but also for undermining 
them (de Rosa, 2007). Moreover, this theoretical perspective offers an interpretation of how 
communities respond to threatening events that is grounded in collective meaning making 
processes (instead of individual needs, motives and cognitions), thereby shedding light on the 
symbolic forces that drive collective behavior and moving beyond the conventional 
psychological approach based on treating crises at the individual level. 
 
2.1 Collective symbolic coping 
 
‘Coping’ is a term used to refer to how people manage and respond to the demands of a 
challenging environment (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). By extension, collective symbolic coping 
refers to the efforts undertaken by people in making sense of a new phenomenon: how they 





cope with it (Wagner et al., 2002). Public discourses from different sources (media, experts, 
authorities, etc.), trigger this process, which is thought to develop in four stages:  
a) Awareness. In this initial phase, the new phenomenon is created and communicated as 
relevant. The relevancy lies in the fact that the new object contains or involves some disruptive 
or challenging implications for established habits and rules, or for established ways of thinking. 
The claim of social relevance raises the public’s awareness. 
b) Divergence. Because of the disruptive and challenging nature of the novel phenomenon, 
interpretations are called for, so as to make it understandable and manageable. A set of multiple 
and even alternative interpretations, images and metaphors emerge within groups, partly 
anchored in pre-existing repertoires of knowledge. 
c) Convergence. Successively, and gradually, the competing divergent interpretations tend 
to decrease in number as some retreat, and to converge towards one or a few shared images, that 
are accepted by a majority of people. Groups achieve consensus around one prevailing 
interpretation, yet different groups can accept and take possession of different interpretations.  
d) Normalization. Finally, one or a few interpretations consolidate across groups; 
threatening and alarming images progressively fade and are replaced by less emotional 
representations of the phenomenon. 
The sequential and prescriptively normative linearity of these phases (as they are sometimes 
presented in the literature) can be questioned. In fact, as shown by research on cognitive 
polyphasia (Moscovici, 2000; Jovchelovitch, 2007; de Rosa, 2010; de Rosa & Bocci, 2013a) 
they can also concur simultaneously, and be an expression of the ideological and political 
positioning underlying the stances taken by individuals and groups or even by the same 
individuals in different experiential and emotional moments of their life.  
 
2.2 Hegemonic, emancipated, and polemical social representations  
 
Moscovici’s (1988) classification of social representations has been variously developed and 
used in empirical research (Pop, 2012; de Rosa & Smith, 1998; de Rosa & Bocci, 2013b). 
According to the original proposal, social representations occur in three main forms, depending 
on the degree of consensus they reach within and across groups: 
a) Hegemonic representations are shared to some extent by all members of a group/society 
and are uniform and coercive, signifying the group identity; very few degrees of freedom are 
available for individuals to deviate from this type of representations.  
b) Emancipated representations are created by subgroups, single portions of a society. They 
coexist peacefully, have a certain degree of autonomy, and reflect the differences between 
subgroups within the broader social tissue.  
c) Polemical representations are generated by subgroups in the course of a dispute or social 
controversy, and are intended to be mutually exclusive. They express antagonism or incongruity 
between representations.  
This classification, which is connected to the notion of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 
2000; Jovchelovitch, 2007; de Rosa, 2010; de Rosa & Bocci, 2013a) accounts for three 
typologies of social representations: the fuzzy nature of social knowledge, its fluidity and 
variability, and the possibility that different forms of knowledge may meet and contaminate 
each other even within the same groups and even within individuals. If the sequence of the 
different stages classified according to the collective symbolic coping were clearly undisputed 





they can all continue to coexist, between and within groups, and also in the same individual, as 
empirically demonstrated by research on cognitive polyphasia.  
 
 
3. The study   
 
Based on the notions of collective symbolic coping and the multi-vocality inbuilt to polemical 
social representations, we undertook an exploratory analysis of public communication in 
different countries, extending a pioneer study conducted in Italy that has shown the shift from 
the stage of awareness to that of divergence, where it lingers, without moving towards the 
establishment of dominant images questioning the hypothesis of ‘absolute convergence’ (de 
Rosa & Mannarini, 2020). The general aim was to demonstrate that divergent discourses and 
antinomies (i.e., polemical social representations) characterized the social representations of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in the first wave of the outbreak, staying frozen at the divergence stage of 
the collective symbolic coping process. 
Specifically, we focused on the following research questions:  
1. Based on SRT, we expected that polemical representations would be the prevailing type 
of representations of the pandemic in the period considered because societies needed to make 
sense of a novel phenomenon. 
2. What basic contents characterized polemical social representations? 
2.1 What were the most used metaphors?  
2.2. What were the recurrent antinomies? 
2.3 What were the main explanations provided? As documented by social representations 
research on emerging infective diseases (Eicher & Baumgarten, 2015), we expected to find 
signs of the three classic explanatory patterns, that is, considering the virus as (a) caused by 
stigmatized outgroups or (b) by evil elites, or as (c) a punishment from God. 
 
3.1 Method  
 
A qualitative case study methodology was adopted, built on the proposition (Baxter & Jack, 
2009, i.e., the hypothesis) ‘Polemical social representations of COVID-19 pandemic 
characterize public communication during the first wave of the outbreak’. Using a theory-driven 
approach, 10 instrumental case studies were selected, each corresponding to a country affected 
by the pandemic. Instrumental case studies are used to provide insight into an issue or to help 
perfect a theory; in our study, the cases played a supporting role to exemplify the theory (Stake, 
1995; Flick, 2011; Flick et al, 2015). Each case constitutes a ‘unit of analysis’ (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). 
The countries/cases were purposefully selected according to the principle of maximum 
variation sampling (Patton, 1990), so as to include the greatest variety of geo-political contexts 
available to the leading authors via their international collaborative networks. In each country 
multiple sources were selected (Table 1): institutional websites; international/national/local 
newspapers and news channels; national/international press agencies; and social media 
platforms. The number and the type of sources varied in each country, according to the 
specificity of each communication context. For each source, texts (respectively laws/orders, 
newspaper articles, interviews, newsflashes, and posts) were selected according to salience. 





Sources were monitored weekly, starting in each country when the first COVID-19 case was 
ascertained (Table 1) and ending on August 31st, irrespective of the epidemiological scenario 
characterizing each country at that moment. Texts selected for each source were searched for 
metaphors, antinomies, and lay explanations of the pandemic. Researchers gathered and 
analyzed the data relative to their country, then shared their interpretation with the broader 
research group. Where there were country teams instead of single researchers (as in Italy, in 
Brazil and South Africa), researchers shared their interpretations of data with the national team 
and successively with the extended research group. 
 
 
4. Results  
 
This section starts from Italy as the first EU country dramatically affected by the pandemic 
and continues with other countries on different continents, listed according to the chronological 
order of the certification of ‘patient zero’ in each county (Table 1). References to the specific 
communication sources/texts analyzed are reported in the Appendix with a number in brackets 
[n]. For each country the context in which the outbreak was spreading is described. Findings 





In the period going from the beginning of January to the first half of May, institutional and 
media communication developed through two major phases. The early phase (phase 0) covers 
the initial period of the virus diffusion, going from the beginning of January to March 11, the 
date the lockdown measures were established [1]. The following phase (phase 1) corresponds 
to the period when the restrictive measures were in force. The lockdown period runs from 
March 11 to May 3, the date the first restrictions were lifted [2] and some economic activities 
resumed, while the transition to phase 2 covers the short period between May 3-17, when all 
restrictions were lifted [3]. 
In phase 0, news of the first two cases in Italy spread following the identification of two 
infected Chinese tourists [4]. The story fueled stigmatizing reactions towards the Chinese 
communities in Italy, as witnessed by the President of the Union of Italian-Chinese 
entrepreneurs [5]. The League party leader Matteo Salvini [6] contributed to the anti-immigrant 
sentiment by associating the virus outbreak to the immigrants disembarking in Italian ports. As 
in past epidemics (de Rosa & Mannarini, 2021), the blame for the disease was attributed to a 
stigmatized outgroup, and stigmatization served as a semantic barrier though which this 
polemical social representation rejected dialogue with alternative discourses (Gillespie, 2008).  
The Italian Prime Minister addressed both Italians and the European countries with 
reassuring words (“Italy has adopted a set of precautionary measures that are the most effective 
in Europe and perhaps even internationally. Therefore, Italian citizens must remain calm and 
tranquil, we are facing the situation with the utmost sense of responsibility”) [7]. The binomial 
threat-reassurance (Ungar, 1998; Washer, 2004) characterized the early phase of the 
institutional communication on the developing pandemic. 
The scientific debate was pluralistic from the very beginning, and in this phase revolved 





February 23, Maria Rita Gismondo, Director of the Virology Lab at the Sacco Hospital in 
Milan, minimized the peril of the virus by defining COVID-19 as “an infection a tiny bit more 
serious than a flu” [8]. Other scientists emphasized the seriousness of the situation and accused 
Gismondo of spreading anti-evidence-based information [9].  
In Phase 1 political communication used alarm as the prevention strategy. War metaphors 
dominated communication: “A tyrant has turned our lives upside down, and it’s called a 
coronavirus. We will stand and fight anywhere, in homes, workplaces. Helping the weakest and 
sacrificing ourselves for a better tomorrow. And then we will make up for it. Coronavirus, you 
won’t win. We’ve hunted worse”. So tweeted virologist Roberto Burioni [10], collecting more 
than 4,000 retweets. War language surfaced in portraying doctors and health professional as 
“soldiers at the front” (Pope Francis’ words [11]); in the isolation of the contaminated ‘red 
zones’ (a reminiscence of the French ‘zone rouge’ in World War I: Thornton, 2014); in the 
strict quarantine prescriptions for the infected and their relatives; in the shutdown of schools, 
industries, cinemas, theatres, churches, museums, stadiums, auditoriums; in strict behavior 
regulations; in the order to ‘stay home’; and finally, in the shocking pictures of 70 military 
vehicles carrying the bodies of virus victims to the cemetery (de Rosa & Mannarini, 2020, p. 
5.17). 
Ambiguous and paradoxical communication marked this phase: a multi-voiced discourse 
emerged, although still in latent forms, focusing alternately on health or the economy. For 
example, the Head of Civil Protection replied to journalists: “protective masks are only for the 
carriers of the virus, not for healthy people” [12], rather than admitting that there were not 
enough masks for everyone. The message changed in the following months, when supplies 
arrived and masks could be sold at a reasonable price. On the economic side, the political debate 
focused on how big the investments for the economic recovery of the country should be. Such 
multi-vocality was bound to explode in the final part of this phase. The escalation of such 
dynamics progressively led to further investments by the Government that in August reached 
223,1 million euros for 2020 and 74.4 million euros for 2021[13]. 
Indeed, at the beginning the evidence of the infection had put fear at the center, leading to 
the enforcement of lockdown measures. Despite the emergence of a multi-voiced discourse, the 
‘war-like’ situation and related focus on fear for life served as a unifying frame for public 
response, and the terror of contagion helped citizens abide by the restrictions. In the transition 
to phase 2, with the progressive reopening, divergences exploded, in Parliament [14] and within 
the opposition [15]. The unity among the Regions’ Governors decreased [16]. A clash between 
the Regions and the State [17], and between the mayors and the Regional Governors also 
occurred [18] in the two weeks before restrictions were lifted. Moreover, a variety of positions 
on the reopening were expressed by different economic actors based on their specific sectors 
(entrepreneurs, trade unions, retailers and craftsmen, restaurant and bar owners [19]).  
This polyphonic choir heightened cognitive and existential uncertainty and simultaneously 
elicited the search for symbols of unity able to counterbalance the chaotic landscape of 
divergent information: the President of the Republic and the Pope were recognized as moral 
authorities and symbolic leaders of national unity, able to provide people with a sense of shared 
identity and collective hope. 
In the communication context of the approaching phase 2, polemical social representations 
that had previously focused on fear for life shifted towards fear for poverty (pandemic versus 
famine), under the pressure of economic actors and politicians who exploited the needs of 
ordinary people in an attempt to overturn the current government. As the editor of a right-wing 





coronavirus” [20]. Simultaneously, nuanced and non-binary speeches that developed along the 
dangerousness-safety line emerging in the early phase, were offered by scientists, who warned 
that “the devil is in the details” [21] and induced caution in reopening.  
The symbolic elaboration of the pandemic across the two phases seemed to revolve around 
polemical representations, based on opposing priorities and dictating responses that reflected a 
political positioning. Such a positioning was in some case polarized and even contradictory, as 
these further examples reveal: (a) in the early phase, the leader of the League Party Matteo 
Salvini, criticizing the Prime Minister’s decision to close ‘red zones’, advocated ‘opening 
everything’, then ‘closing everything’ within a few days [22]. (b) As a symbolic anti-stigma act 
and as a sign of symbolic inclusion, in reply to Salvini’s demand for schools to be closed to 
Chinese children, President Mattarella visited a multicultural school in the Esquilino district in 
Rome [23]. (c) In phase 2 polemical representations exposed opposing antinomic priorities – 
economy versus health – and demands – ‘opening everything immediately’ versus ‘opening 
step by step with prudence’. Like stigmatization, rigid oppositions are one more way for social 
representations to prevent dialogue with alternative representations (Gillespie, 2008). 
Polarization was evidently related to the political positioning. Populist leaders used 
polemical social representations to stimulate fear in the citizens, thus inducing the need to be 
reassured by strongmen (de Rosa et al., 2020). During the pandemic, in Italy this role was 
mainly played by League party leaders, but the media reported many international examples of 
leaders taking advantage of frightened people to consolidate their power [24]. 
 
Spain 
COVID-19 is a new and previously unknown infection. The Spanish population was 
suddenly obliged to make sense of it and construct social representations about it to know how 
to manage it in their daily lives and in their communication with loved ones. Based on this need 
to make sense, the mass media emerged as the main tool to transmit scientific information about 
COVID-19 as well as its effects on the population. As it was an unknown phenomenon, both 
science and lay knowledge about the virus appeared intertwined. The limit between scientific 
and lay knowledge in this case was blurred. However, mass media was also used to 
communicate social norms regarding ‘what to do’ to avoid infections. In this case, reified 
universes used prescriptive and mainly one-directional discourse in communication (Batel & 
Castro, 2009). 
The first known case of an infected person in Spain was on 31 January [25]. People faced an 
unknown disease that seemed to come from China. China is represented in the Spanish 
population as one of the most distant places in the world and as having different eating habits 
and lifestyles. At this stage (phase 0), the population represented Chinese citizens as the other, 
and soon after infections started to spread in Spain, a first aggression against a North American 
citizen of Chinese appearance occurred in Spain [26]. At that time, the population anchored 
COVID-19 in terms of its similarity to a simple flu [27] even if soon its consequences appeared 
to be much worse.   
Phase 1 in Spain started with one of the most restrictive lockdown measures in Europe after 
the Spanish President Pedro Sánchez declared a state of emergency on 9 March [28]. During 
phase 1, there were three main characteristics of mass media communication about COVID-19 
in Spain. The media started opening their front pages with the numbers of infections and deaths. 
Every day during the lockdown period, from March 15 till June 20, the media reported numbers 
of infected people and deaths in the different regions of Spain. Second, figures and images were 





to show the collapse of the health system [29]. Shocking images of corpses stored in the ice 
palace of Madrid were shown on TV [30]. The Spanish population seemed to be proud of having 
one of the best health systems in the world according to Bloomberg [31] (Fullman et al., 2018). 
However, the information about the people who died in nursing homes was both surprising and 
devastating. Further, situations of mistreatment were identified and published in newspapers 
[32]. This situation has reduced the trust people place in the health system.  
After the lockdown stage, Spain entered a situation that was labeled by the media as ‘the 
new normality’ [33]. Spain was supposed to return to Phase 0. However, ‘the new normality’ 
metaphorically meant that the traditional lifestyle of people was far from coming back. Instead 
of the health situation, the economic implications of the strict lockdown stage started to be 
emphasized in the media [34]. In fact, some mass media reports are now trying to explain why 
the consequences of the disease were and are worse in Spain compared to other countries in the 
world [35]. Even if multiple factors are likely to explain this situation according to the letters 
sent by several doctors to the Lancet (García-Basteiro et al., 2020), one of them is social 
inequality. Thus, the implications of the disease are not equally distributed in the population 
and they seem to be more intense in lower socio-economic classes in areas of high-density 
population. Thus, it seems that at least partially, a social perspective on the disease might help 
to explain its prevalence in some disadvantaged locations [36]. In this sense, the implications 
of the disease seem to transcend biology to become a social or political issue. 
Some of the research done in the Basque Country suggests mass media reports had important 
consequences on the emotional state of the population. Empirical research conducted in Spain 
during the epidemic shows that the most frequent word that comes to the minds of people older 
than 60 when thinking about COVID-19 is fear (Ozamiz-Etxebarria et al., 2020). Fear was 
related to concepts associated with risk, the danger of its consequences and the doubts about 
how to prevent it. Moreover, the disappointment at reading reports about the collapse in care 
and health institutions created distrust. Research conducted during the three months of the 
lockdown stage (Castelo et al., 2020) showed that especially for older people, trust in the health 
care system, in caregivers and in relationship networks was reduced. Results seemed to suggest 
that the social trust of the elderly (an indicator of well-being) was associated to the trust they 
hold in health care institutions  
 
Romania 
The first case of coronavirus was reported in Romania on February 26. From March 16 to 
May 15, the state imposed a state of emergency with strict lockdown regulations. Until the end 
of the state of emergency, the number of COVID-19 cases rose to 16,437, still with a low 
infection rate compared to many other countries. From May 16 a state of alert was in place, 
which entailed the gradual reopening of churches and of businesses that had been closed, but 
also the mandatory wearing of face masks in closed public spaces. The infection rate rose 
exponentially during this period: until the end of August, Romania confirmed over 85,000 cases 
and over 3,500 COVID-19-related deaths. In August 2020, Romania ranks among the five 
European countries with the highest per capita case growth [37]. 
This drastic worsening is probably related not only to the failure of the authorities to control 
the virus spread, but also to the population’s incomplete compliance with the sanitizing and 
social distancing measures required. One of the factors relevant here may be the externalization 
of agency concerning contamination and protection by localizing the virus threat outside the 
country. The Romanian public discourse on the pandemic very quickly gained a social identity 





‘contaminated diaspora’, i.e. Romanians living abroad and returning home, because of the 
current economic hardship in their adoptive countries. The first Romanian COVID-19 cases, 
largely mediatized, were Romanians that had returned home from abroad, especially from Italy, 
where the COVID-19 incidence was already high, which fueled the ideological division 
between us and them. As the Orthodox Easter was approaching, anxiety towards the yearly 
mass return of the diaspora rose, and President Klaus Iohannis urged Romanians living abroad 
not to return home for Easter [38]. This illustrates the extension of the health crisis in the social 
identity and ideological realm, as the Romanian diaspora has played a symbolic and active role 
in the public protests against corruption. Consequently, the coronavirus crisis has been used by 
the critics of the #resist movement to redefine this category as unhealthy and the country as 
under siege, culminating with a text from a member of the Romanian Academy stating that “It’s 
unheard of that the healthy ones call plague-carrying rats to die in their city” [39]. There is also 
a nationalistic side of this ideological representation of the Romanian epidemic, especially 
linked to a symbolic positioning of Italy: as it is the country in which a large Romanian diaspora 
resides, the health danger represented by the diaspora in general was cumulated with the one 
associated to Italy’s high infection rate during the first stage of Romanian epidemic; moreover, 
the first case of COVID-19 infection in a Romanian was associated to an Italian citizen visiting 
Romania. A clear symbolic manifestation of this implicit status of Italy in the Romanian public 
perception was that most media referred to the first hotspot of coronavirus infections, namely 
Suceava county, as “Romania’s Lombardy” [40]. 
Secondly, the officials publicly communicated on the pandemic and the suitable control 
measures in a militaristic, top down fashion. From the beginning, the situation was framed as 
an epic battle that requires a military-like control over all aspects of social life, with President 
Iohannis stating: “We have to win this life and death battle” [41]. This war frame was useful in 
justifying the drastic lockdown measures (“we will not stop and we’ll impose even tougher 
measures when they become mandatory” [42]), but at the same time it placed the responsibility 
for controlling the pandemic in the hands of the authorities and more out of reach of the citizens. 
The militaristic approach is emphasized by the fact that all the epidemic management is 
governed not directly by specific state representatives, but by a specially designed institution, 
the National Committee for Special Emergency Situations (NCSES) [43]. The governance 
during the epidemic has been executed through military ordinances, with 12 such ordnances 
issued until August 2020 [44], praised by the Interior Minister Marcel Vela as “consolidating 
the wall against this invisible and aggressive enemy” [45]. In the same militaristic approach, 
the civil management of hospitals in which coronavirus hotspots were discovered was replaced 
with military officers, and all daily press releases of NCSES include the number of people who 
have been sanctioned the day before for violating the current anti-coronavirus law, and the 
overall value of the fines issued. 
The chorus of public positions criticizing the appropriateness of the measures imposed to 
control the epidemic has been polyphonic, from health professionals [46] to the Romanian 
Orthodox Church who insisted on using the same chalice and spoon in the Eucharist for all 
believers, and opposed the banning of church services [47], or to the President of the Romanian 
Academy who referred to the regulation allowing  people over 65 years old to leave their homes 
only during a 2-hour interval as “putting them on a leash” [48]. Moreover, the former 
government party publicly defined the government regulation imposing quarantine and 
hospitalization of those infected with the new coronavirus as abusive and submitted an appeal 
to the Constitutional Court, which was accepted. This led to a legislative void of almost a month 





[49]. Similarly, public figures from the opposition party expressed their opposition towards 
wearing protective masks, such as the party President during the Parliament sessions and two 
other parliamentarians who were fined because they aggressively refused to wear the mask in 
a restaurant [50]. 
Finally, the chronic social representation of the public governors and of the medical system 
as corrupt also contributed to the growing mistrust in the appropriateness of the measures taken 
and of the appeals for public compliance. During the epidemic, it was amplified by news 
concerning the suspicious purchase of protective equipment or medical devices without 
respecting public acquisition procedures by state officials, while also asking for immunity from 
prosecution [51]. Also, frontline medical professionals’ public appeals to the population to 
respect the social distancing rules were frequently met with disbelief. One of the reasons is that 
they have been suspected of having a personal interest in emphasizing the severity of the disease 
and of misdiagnosing COVID-19 as the first cause of death, as they were given a 500-euro 
monthly bonus during the pandemic. Fueling the suspicions of endemic corruption, unjustified 
preferential coronavirus testing was reported to have been given to some individuals close to 
those managing local hospitals [52]. 
 
Malta 
As in other countries, COVID-19 was a shock to Maltese society. In phase 0, when Malta 
was not yet hit by COVID, people followed the media to obtain information.  Some thought it 
was just a scare, while others took it more seriously and began to hoard food and essential 
toiletries. When the first case was diagnosed on the 7 March, what for many was a remote event 
now became real because it had now reached this little island. The Prime Minister, Dr. Abela 
and the Minister for Health Dr. Fearne, appeared on the media giving information. Abela 
downplayed the seriousness of the event and said “This is not the plague” [53].  Fearne on the 
other hand was more cautious and stressed the importance of vigilance [54]. The parties in 
opposition supported Fearne’s vigilant stance.   
When the number of cases increased, partial lockdown was announced. People over 80, 
anchored their understanding of the pandemic to the comparison with World War II. In addition 
to war, the pandemic was also conceptualized as a wave. Medical authorities spoke about 
flattening the curve and this morphed to flattening the wave. The wave became a metaphor for 
COVID-19. This image was also taken up by politicians who referred to the wave of COVID-
19 or simply ‘the wave’. 
Throughout phase 1 (lockdown) daily health bulletins were delivered by Prof Gauci, the 
Superintendent of Health. At 12.30 pm every day, Gauci gave the numbers of how many people 
were diagnosed and how many recovered. She became the personification of the soldier leading 
the army in the war against COVID-19. She was watched by a record number of people leading 
to the highest ever registered national average number of hours viewed on the national 
broadcaster [55]. Many experienced fear. Those who had big houses and gardens felt the strain 
less than those living in small flats. Professionals and urban planners soon realized the 
importance of open spaces for the mental wellbeing of society. 
The rhetoric used by the authorities was contrasting. The messages given by the Prime 
Minister differed from those of the Minister of Health. The media picked this up and traced it 
back to the fight for leadership within the Partit Laburista (PL, Labour Party) in January 2020, 
when there was an election for leader of the PL and for Prime Minister. The two contestants 
were Abela and Fearne with Abela winning the election. The divergence in the discourse by 





them. Abela spoke about a ‘small wave’, while Fearne talked about the ‘tsunami’ that could 
overcome Malta’s health system [56].  
Many people worked from home. Schools and universities closed and teachers and lecturers 
gave lessons and lectures online. Over 300 churches and chapels in the Maltese islands closed 
down and the Archbishop celebrated mass and recited the rosary every day. This event was 
broadcast at 5.30 p.m. on the national broadcaster and on the Church media. Even people who 
were not regular churchgoers felt the need to pray with the Archbishop.  
Fear of contagion gave rise to stigmatized reactions. In the case of Malta, the stigmatized 
group were the irregular immigrants who arrived by boat. They became a central part of the 
discourse of blame fuelled by the actions and discourse of the Prime Minister. Saying that 
immigrants could be a threat to Maltese people, Abela hired three big boats, which were 
normally used for trips around the Maltese islands and kept irregular immigrants at sea [57].  
The Prime minister, a lawyer by profession and the Minister for Health, a medical doctor, 
had different priorities. The lawyer, who had to lead a country, was very much aware of the 
economy. The doctor, on the other hand, was concerned about the availability of beds and 
respirators. As in the neighboring country Italy, the polemical social representation, which 
previously focused on fear for life, shifted towards fear of poverty. The hospitality industry put 
pressure on Abela and the fear of loss of jobs was used to explain the need to move on and lift 
lockdown measures.  
In June Abela claimed that everything was under control and that life could go back to 
normal. He consistently downplayed the seriousness of the pandemic, making fun of ‘the wave’ 
and not wearing a mask whenever he appeared at events. He announced that “we have won the 
war”. Pressed to say whether the risk assessment would be published, Abela said the Health 
Superintendent drew up the document. He appealed to the media not to instill fear in people. 
Possibly referring to Fearne, he said that “It seems, unfortunately, that there are some people 
who are not happy at the fact that we are returning to normality” [58].  
Restrictions were lifted. The seaport and the airport were opened and the prime minister 
announced that he was keeping the promise of giving the Maltese people ‘a good summer’. He 
said that “waves are in the sea and there is no need to strike up public fear of a second wave” 
[59]. He also said that the best thing people can do was to go to the sea and enjoy themselves. 
In a period of two weeks, Malta became the party island with the launch of four big 
international music festivals to be attended by tens of thousands of tourists and Maltese people. 
At the end of July, Abela triumphantly announced “I had expressed my determination that 
people would enjoy the summer – and many said that we did not know what we were doing 
then,” …. “And I kept my word with you”. This was received with a roaring applause from his 
live audience [60]. The first mass event, a party which lasted a whole weekend – dubbed as the 
Hotel take-over weekend – resulted in a resurgence of COVID cases. Shortly afterwards, new 
cases associated with the village ‘festa of Santa Venera’ were reported. The numbers continued 
to grow. Malta now joins a growing list of countries forced to reintroduce airport controls after 
early successes in controlling the disease [61].  
The association of doctors (MAM) together with the association for nurses and health 
professionals blamed the prime minister for the crass way he had led the transition to Phase 2. 
Abela said that everything was under control, however in a matter of a few weeks the number 
of active cases went up from 3 to over 600 with Malta becoming one of the countries considered 
unsafe to travel to. In Malta, from 7 March to 25 August 2020, there have been 1,612 confirmed 






(b) North America  
 
Canada 
We will discuss here the media, political and scientific discourse in Canada about COVID-
19 in three phases. Phase 0, which runs from early January to mid-March, 2020, covers the 
period of uncertainty about the health and economic impact of COVID-19. Phase 1 covers the 
containment period from mid-March to mid-May. Phase 2 includes the gradual release from 
containment and the new health measures put in place.   
On January 11, 2020 (phase 0), the first COVID-19-related death in China was reported in 
the Canadian media, naming the virus for the first time as a coronavirus [63]. An initial 
representational anchoring was noticed when, from the early days of this phase, newspapers 
made many parallels with the SARS coronavirus outbreak in Toronto in 2003. Physicians and 
researchers pointed to the similarity between COVID-19 and SARS, believing that the danger 
to Canadians remained low, even for travelers returning from Wuhan, the first COVID-19 
outbreak center in China [64].  
Towards the end of January, polemical representations emerged. On the one hand, the 
Canadian media referred to the COVID-19 epidemic as a ‘crisis’, despite the absence of 
confirmed cases in the country [65]. Scientists and researchers, on the other hand, described the 
situation as ‘low risk’, but remained ‘alert’ to the spread of the virus [66]. Fears of an economic 
crisis were also emerging at that time [67], creating a tension between health and economic 
prosperity. Provincial public health authorities were preparing for the worst in hospitals [68] 
and nursing homes [69].  
The tension between ‘us’ and ‘the other’ has been growing as a result of new fears. One of 
the fears during that phase concerned the Chinese community and the repatriation of many 
Chinese Canadians trapped in the Wuhan area. Some media sources document stigmatizing 
comments and gestures by some citizens. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau called for calm and 
respect for Chinese communities in the face of the rise of racist messages on social networks 
[70]. However, the tone was changing, as evidenced in the case of Canadians who were on board 
the cruise ship Diamond Princess, the main epidemic center outside China. Repatriation 
measures for Canadians abroad specified that those with symptoms would not be allowed to 
return home at that time [71]. Fear increased even more when Sophie Grégoire-Trudeau, wife 
of the Prime Minister, announced that she had been diagnosed with COVID-19 after an event 
in England. The Prime Minister's decision to isolate himself harbored anxiety about the spread 
of the virus [72]. The virus could no longer be associated only with the other—even though after 
the Chinese, the Americans began to take on the role of the guilty foreigner. 
Phase 1 began with the provincial government measures to limit gatherings, close schools 
and ban hospital visits [73]. A first scandal that demonstrates the ambiguous and contradictory 
nature of the informational environment in which the representational genesis occurred was 
when on March 12 Ontario Premier Doug Ford encouraged families to “go on vacation” during 
spring break. The next day, the Ontario government announced that schools would be closed for 
at least two more weeks. Ford's message was criticized by public-health officials who were 
calling on all Canadians to avoid out-of-town travel [74]. 
Some journalists used language reminiscent of war. The terms ‘war zone’, ‘combat’ and ‘war 
effort’ were used to describe the situation in hospitals and long-term care centers in Quebec and 
Ontario [75] that have had to ask the army for help to assist orderlies and nurses [76]. Fears 
were growing among the population about the country's food supply. The provincial and federal 





headlines was the one for personal protective medical equipment, of which there were only a 
few weeks stocks left. The media reported daily on the remaining supplies in the provinces, 
while doctors feared a lack of equipment [78]. 
Some experts, media and politicians believe that the epidemic has highlighted social 
inequalities in Canada, with the most vulnerable, the elderly, the sick and the poor, being more 
affected by the virus and the shutdown of a large part of the Canadian economy [79]. Opposite 
the villains, those responsible for the epidemic and its mismanagement, also the heroes appeared 
in the discourse. In Quebec, nurses were dubbed ‘guardian angels’ during this period by Premier 
François Legault to highlight the courage of these health care workers. Messages of compassion 
and support frequently appeared in the newspapers for those heroes: doctors, nurses and other 
essential workers, but also for the new actor in the media discourse: the victims, the families of 
those who had died from COVID-19 [80]. 
In phase 2, confirmed cases of COVID-19 were concentrated mainly in two provinces, 
Quebec and Ontario. Within those provinces, the majority of cases were in long-term care 
facilities. Attention then turned to the protection of the elderly, and scandals in the management 
of this health crisis in long-term care centers cause society’s relationship with elderly people to 
be reassessed. The few voices that at the beginning of the pandemic depersonalized and 
dehumanized the elderly were replaced by more influential voices that this time called for 
isolating the elderly in order to protect them. Tacitly, the victim was held responsible for his 
situation.     
Among government leaders, the decision to reopen the economy and certain services such as 
schools would make it possible to avoid facing the perverse effects of confinement (increasing 
domestic violence, social isolation, business failure, etc.) [81]. Schools in Quebec were among 
the first to reopen. Children in daycare and elementary schools were sent back to school for the 
remaining two months of the school year and had to follow physical distancing and hand-
washing measures. The response was not the same in other provinces, for example in Ontario, 
where the government - in agreement with the public opinion - decided to close schools for the 
rest of the school year [82]. 
Despite the reopening of the economy, some businesses across the country were concerned 
that the measures put in place to ensure physical distancing may not allow them to remain viable. 
Governments and experts were also concerned that a second wave of COVID-19 cases may 
occur. No major controversy seemed to have affected the beginning of the re-opening of the 
country.  
However, additional economic measures and the opening of businesses, such as bars, in 
addition to the requirement to wear a mask in certain cities and provinces, have to a small degree 
rekindled a debate in public opinion [83]. The gathering of some young people was blamed for 
putting the population at risk when the bars reopened. A new group is thus beginning to be 
targeted by stigmatization. 
In Canada, lockdown and re-opening have occurred on different scales across the provinces. 
The heart of the scandals and major events took place in the two most affected provinces, 
Ontario and Quebec, particularly in long-term care facilities. The opinions of the various 
stakeholders (politicians, journalists, experts, the public) on the pandemic have been constantly 
shifting between the different phases, especially on the measures to be taken and the dangers of 
the virus spreading. In spite of a relatively stable evolution and without spillover of public 
opinion on the implementation of confinement (and reopening) measures, certain events have 
marked the imagination and challenged the public on the country’s contribution to certain social 





(c) Latin America 
 
Brazil 
From the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the social media have taken a singular role in 
disseminating information on the disease to Brazilians. Further, the worsening of cases triggered 
more information and guidelines by government health authorities in the country. In Brazil, the 
epidemic phases were not as clear as in other countries. The first preventive actions, before case 
1 - which would correspond to phase 0 - began in February, with the repatriation of Brazilians 
(February 9) who lived in Wuhan, the Chinese city that was the epicenter of the infection. In 11 
days, the country confirmed case 1 (February 20), which did not prevent the country's biggest 
party - Carnival - from happening in a few days (February 24, 25). 
After Carnival, in mid-February 2020, the Ministry of Health notified the first COVID-19 
case in Brazil [84] and, approximately fifteen days later, the same ministry started to broadcast 
guidelines to the population with regard to protection methods to cope with the emergency in 
public health, featuring international importance, caused by the pandemic (restrictions in travel, 
events and telework for at-risk groups), under the administration of the Minister of Health, the 
physician Luis Henrique Mandetta. As from that instance, the minister started daily nationwide 
TV broadcasts on epidemiological data in Brazil, guidelines, and responses to doubts expressed 
by the media and by the population in general.  Guidelines [85] followed the norms issued by 
the World Health Organisation (WHO), with information based on technical and scientific 
criteria, which, foregrounded the experience of the disease’s development in other countries, 
indicated social distancing as a highly feasible strategy to prevent contamination (Ferguson et 
al., 2020) - the containment phase was starting, that is, phase 1. 
Local authorities, such as mayors and state governors, followed the Minister of Health´s 
guidelines and decreed norms for social distancing throughout the whole country. However, in 
spite of all the scientific information disseminated by the health authorities worldwide and by 
the Brazilian government, the Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, started to demonstrate a 
stance against social distancing and raised doubts on the number of people stricken by the 
disease in Brazil. He stated that the media were exaggerating information on the number of 
deaths and people infected and had caused panic among the population (Planalto, 2020). The 
President also referred to the pandemic as an “insignificant flu” [86] and stated that people 
should face the ‘rain’ and they should not remain at home because of fear. They should continue 
a normal life to avoid an economic crisis, which would be highly serious to Brazil. His posts in 
the social media revealed doubts on the number of victims. After some days, several posts on 
the social network such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram were deleted by the social networks 
due to the harm caused to public health [87].  
The contradictions between the federal government´s discourse and the Ministry of Health’s 
daily bulletin released by the media produced two phenomena. The first was an increase in the 
social influence of information since, within a extremely ambiguous attitude, we seek in other 
people the source of information to guide our activities (Sherif, 1935; Moscovici, 1976). As a 
result of such a process, there was a significant increase in news-sharing through the social 
network. However, such information did not always have a reliable source and it collaborated 
with the dissemination of fake news. In other words, within the context of a crisis situation, 
foregrounded by uncertainties, less importance was given to the news source and greater 
importance was provided to the dissemination of news.  
However, in the behavior manifested by the President of the Brazilian Republic and that of 





became the victim of fake news by Bolsonaro´s fans who accused him of corruption. After the 
dismissal of Mandetta, another physician, Nelson Teich [88], was appointed. He remained just 
a month and he discovered that reconciliation between scientific knowledge and the President´s 
discourse was impossible. The latter insisted on the institution of a medical protocol making 
mandatory the use of hydroxychloroquine as a treatment for the COVID-19 in Brazil [89], even 
though no scientifically known efficiency was attributed to the medicine.  
When Brazil´s death tally reached 2,575 deaths and 40,581 confirmed cases of people 
infected with COVID-19, President Jair Bolsonaro replied that he was not a grave digger [90] 
when questioned on the number of deaths. When 5,017 deaths were reported, he replied “So 
what?!” [91]. After Teich´s dismissal, a military general, Eduardo Pazzuelo, lacking any 
medical training, was appointed as Minister of Health on a short-time basis. His first activity 
was the institution of the COVID-19 protocol featuring hydroxychloroquine [92] [93]. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Justice demanded explanations on the use of the protocol 
[94]. Another measure taken by the military minister was the ceasing of any broadcasting on the 
number of deaths or infected people in Brazil [95], greatly criticized by the legislative and 
judiciary sectors [96]. On 8 August 2020, Brazil could boast 85 days without a Minister of 
Health and reached the terrible score of 100,000 deaths and three million people infected [97].It 
is not possible to identify the phase we are in  at the end of August 2020 because the states are 
reducing their prevention measures. 
The polarization of information and prescriptions on the COVID-19 pandemic favored the 
emergence of doubts and fake news, affecting prevention practices among Brazilians, which 
proved to be highly heterogeneous in a country the size of a continent (Justo et al., 2020). On 
the other hand, the different behaviors vis-à-vis the pandemic are due to decisions on strategies 
on social distancing and lockdown determined by state governors and municipal mayors. In fact, 
in April 2020, the Supreme Court guaranteed such autonomy to governors and mayors to 
determine rules for coping with the pandemic in their respective territories [98]. Furthermore, 
the intense political polarization in the country should be emphasized (Giacomozzi et al., 2019), 
which may have contributed towards the construction of different forms of representation of the 




The pandemic arrived in Mexico at a time when important transformations were taking place. 
President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, and his staff, implemented important changes in all 
government areas since December 2018. The results of these changes had still not been seen 
when COVID-19 arrived in the country in February 2020.  
Financial analysts and specialists [99] announced that Mexico was facing the pandemic in a 
condition of poverty (almost half of population [100]), important health problems (obesity, 
hypertension and diabetes [101]), economic weakness and a political polarization that had 
accrued due to the world oil crisis. The President has announced, day to day, increasing 
measures of ‘republican austerity’ [102], that translate into important budget cuts to public 
service agencies. Temporary closing of large, medium and small size companies has produced 
unemployment and there is a pessimistic forecast for economic recuperation and an increase in 
poverty levels [103]. The Mexican peso depreciation has worsened the country’s outlook. 
At the beginning of the pandemic, Mexican people were witnessing the exponential increase 
of infections in Asia and Europe as a far-away, though threatening, nightmare. The first set of 





with a high socioeconomic level. The Governor of Puebla was eager to mention that COVID 
was a rich people’s disease [104]. The quick expansion of the virus made it clear that COVID 
had no respect for frontiers or social status.  
Since the end of February 2020, a team of experts led by Hugo Lopez Gatell, have been 
presenting a daily report on the pandemic development and government actions to reduce 
damages [105]. The government established 3 contingency phases or scenarios to prevent the 
spread of COVID-19 [106]:  
Phase 1: Imported cases (27/02/20 to 23/03/20). Measures: reduce physical contact, 
constantly wash the hands, monitoring of detected cases, disclosure of relevant information in 
offices and schools and attention to the official media.  
Phase 2: Community transmission (24/03/20 to 20/04/20). Measures: social distancing, avoid 
handshakes, kisses and hugs, temporarily suspend non-essential and school activities, mass 
events in open and closed spaces, health control at the entrance of buildings, basic hygiene 
measures, sneezing etiquette, care of vulnerable groups, voluntary isolation. Essential activities: 
those related with health, public safety, maintenance of critical infrastructure, social programs 
and key sectors of the economy. 
Phase 3: Epidemiological stage (21/03/20 to 01/06/20). Measures: the same measures as in 
the previous phases, in addition to intensive and permanent dissemination of mitigation 
measures, symptoms and warning signs of COVID-19, suspension of contact with persons 
diagnosed or suspected of having the disease, indefinite suspension of non-essential activities 
and public events. 
After phase 3, the government implemented a weekly epidemiological risk light by region, 
in order to restart economic, social and productive activities [107]. The official COVID-19 
maps, produced daily, show that the traffic lights have changed from red to orange almost 
everywhere in the country, indicating that the situation of the pandemic is still dangerous [108].  
Based on the fact that faith in science would create trust and calm within the Mexican 
population, Lopez Gatell and his team focused their efforts on explaining what kind of virus 
COVID-19 is, how it behaves and transmits, its lethality rate and the lack of a treatment to cure 
it. Through the translation of scientific knowledge into urgent health programs and preventive 
actions, the government has been creating specialized social representations about COVID-19, 
inspired by international information (mainly communicated by WHO), and the record of virus 
evolution in Mexico as well as the experience in previous pandemic situations.  
In order to understand these pseudoscientific social representations about COVID, the 
population depends on the translation of scientific language into the common sense language 
used by news reporters, communicators and on all that is published or expressed in social media. 
The lack of certitude about COVID, failed government communications and common-sense 
interpretations have created confusion and incertitude. Some reporters began to question the 
official number of deaths and people infected, on which the government relies to take action and 
make statistical projections about the pandemic [109].  
There was not a clear understanding of whether or not one should use a face mask because 
Dr. López Gatell sometimes said it was not necessary, but on other occasions he recommended 
it [110]. In the media it was difficult to understand the control phases established by government 
to manage actions to deal with the pandemic, especially over the criteria to define the most 
critical phase. A polemic discussion was generated over triage of people that should be treated 
as a priority in hospitals. This situation created a dispute about who had the right to live, the 
younger, the less sick, etc. [111]. Fear started to expand within the population, particularly the 





suspected of being contagious with COVID [112]. Attacks on medical staff in the streets started 
to be published on social media [113].  
Despite efforts made by experts to communicate specialized social representations about 
COVID-19, its risks and mortality levels, these were ignored or misunderstood. President 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador has never worn a face mask and took a long time to stop his 
working tours [114]. He was always shown surrounded by people, hugging and shaking hands, 
and even kissing a child in one scene [115]. By violating the basic protection measures, he 
delegitimized the knowledge and position of specialists. Thus, by the beginning of May most 
people were not staying at home or keeping a healthy distance. Even in July 2020, many people 
did not use face masks [116]. 
The recommendations about the pandemic, the warnings about its lethality and the damage 
caused in other countries did not create enough consciousness in the majority of Mexicans. 
Many Mexican people still believe that the pandemic does not really exist and that it is a political 
conspiracy [117]. Some traditional religious and social feasts have taken place all over the 
country during the pandemic [118]. Businesses stayed open at the beginning, on one hand due 
to economic reasons and on the other because life continued to go on. People kept their routines 
until the isolation measures became more severe for ‘non-essential activities’. In terms of social 
representations, people were forced to think about their actions in accordance to this new 
dichotomous classification (essential/non-essential activity), social distance and unusual 
hygiene habits.  
Again, official decrees about the classification of these activities were ineffective when faced 
with the new challenge of daily survival and the social disparities in protecting against the virus. 
The need to earn a daily income by performing any kind of activity, essential or not, has kept 
the neediest people on the streets. Self-isolation to safeguard our health has become a luxury, 
which not everybody can aspire for, even when the pandemic becomes more risky and severe 
[119].  
The health crisis has brought an unexpected and unprecedented change to people’s lives, to 
socio-economic dynamics and the way Mexican institutions operate. By the end of July 2020, 
Mexico had the world’s third highest number of deaths and the sixth highest number of 
infections according to the Johns Hopkins University COVID-19 data. The economic havoc and 
health crisis foreshadow an overwhelming future for the Mexican population [120].  
 
Argentina  
Talking about a pandemic brings us face to face with a strange, unexpected, shocking 
situation, never imagined before. In this situation, the first reaction of the Argentinian citizens 
was to look for information, read news, compare one's own experience with that already faced 
in other countries, and to find an anchor. Is this really happening? Is it happening to me? 
Strangeness, disorientation and perplexity.  
As chronologically the epidemic first occurred in China and, given the geographical distance, 
it was considered serious but localized, this situation diminished its social importance. But in 
our globalized world, events have a great speed of circulation. The virus spread to Europe, the 
US and finally to Latin America. Argentina was able to draw on the experience of other areas, 
especially Europe. Early prevention and control measures were taken for the epidemic, as soon 
as it appeared (Decree 641/2020) [121]. A few days after the first confirmed case on March 3, 
a strict quarantine and a nation-wide-lockdown was established on March 19, later progressively 
extended to mid-April, 26 April and then to 10 May. “Stay home, we’ll take care of you” was 





Before the spread to Latin America, the country’s Minister of Health had described it as “a 
mild flu”. Then he had to change his first assessment, as the epidemic spread. The measures 
taken were decided by the Argentinian President [123], together with the governors of the 
various districts and a team of advisers, epidemiologists and infectious disease specialists and 
were the result of negotiations and inter-institutional agreements, which were always 
implemented as presidential decrees. The experts began to have a strong political influence on 
the President. The decrees were promulgated every 15 days from 03/20 to the present. This 
central role of the President led to an improvement in his image, confidence and power. 
Economic aid was decreed for the vulnerable population [124]; prohibition of dismissals and 
suspensions [125] and aid to small and medium-sized companies [126]. Benefits were 
formulated to protect personnel working in public health, but they were not met. 
The extremely long quarantine started undermining presidential prestige which, added to a 
huge economic crisis, meant a general crisis of great importance. Also at the same time, in the 
shadow of the quarantine, profound changes began in the judicial structure, with a clearly 
undemocratic tinge. Due to fatigue and exhaustion, [127] the excessively long quarantine 
generated many imbalances and transgressions of the norms imposed [128]. This was 
manifested in significant differences in complying with the rules. As in other regions of the 
world, the transgressions produced major outbreaks, which are experienced as the endless 
existence of the pandemic. 
The inconsistent behavior of the top leaders of each country led to chaos and clashes between 
rational solutions and other magical ones. If the person is in a place of power, their statements 
confuse and foster transgression, as for example the consumption of Hydroxychloroquine led to 
a loss of confidence in leaders. 
Analyzing the dynamic process of constitution of social representations related to COVID-
19, we find: 
(a) Objectification process (from the abstract concept to a concrete image) in the drawing of 
the coronavirus represented through the emoticon of a face with a mask that represents 
emotional and social isolation. The virus also has been objectified as an external enemy that 
must be fought: exemplary at this regard is the US President Trump's conviction of the virus as 
part of the bacteriological fight undertaken by China, as the USA’s commercial rival. 
Some common elements appear throughout the ages: the ‘objectification’ of the 
representation of COVID-19 in heroes: scientific experts, microbiologists, epidemiologists, 
health workers, elite villains (journalists and the media, accused of using fear for their own 
interests and being puppets of the ruling classes and pharmaceutical companies, ineffective 
governments, groups of wealthy cosmopolitan people who travel, get infected and infect others), 
popular villains (careless individuals with low self-control, the mindless masses, people panic-
buying) and victims (the elderly, the poor). 
(b) The anchoring process supported by the classical literature (including authors like 
Boccaccio, Defoe, Camus, Thomas Mann, García Márquez ...among others), that gives an 
account of how various epidemics were faced in the past, talking about the coping models of 
human beings, from the most miserable existence to sublime solidarity. In different centuries, 
human reactions to the risk of illness, death threats and tragedies are extremely similar in 
different historical periods: fear, estrangement, discrimination against the sick, violence, civil 
disobedience, but also solidarity and the contagion of hope. What clearly indicates an important 
difference is the meaning attributed to the disease, in antiquity, fundamentally linked to religious 
beliefs, compared to the secularization of the 20th and 21st centuries more supported by rational-





However, in closed groups with strong religious beliefs, due to their fatalist vision (‘it is the will 
of God’), they do not comply with official protection measures and, by violating restrictions on 
social movement, they became much more ill. The disease was also anchored in outgroups, the 
Chinese, in a clear discriminatory categorization. 
 (c) Themata, as primary ideas, pre-existing thoughts, archetypes linked to culture and 
history, thematic oppositions, contradictions between different types of knowledge existing in 
the world. In particular we may find themata: 
a. in social practices: help / rejection, approach / distance, obedience to official measures / 
violation of quarantine; 
b. in values: solidarity / despair; acceptance of what is different / stigmatization. 
c. in emotions: love and search for proximity / terror, rejection and greater isolation 
Looking prospectively since the known future no longer exists, the coronavirus pandemic 
places us in front of the challenging task of developing the ability to handle extraordinary 





In facing COVID-19, several representations emerge which reveal how past elements are 
reactivated. In the case of COVID-19, relations with the West reveal Indonesia’s inferiority 
complex towards the West. The West as a representation becomes a generic object against all 
white nations (Nandy, 1988; Fanon, 1952/1986; Chen, 2010) and the international community 
beyond merely the Netherlands — the country that colonized Indonesia for 3.5 centuries. Such 
a representation mainly surfaces among those in power and becomes a zone of tension that 
traverses from the past to the present time, and at the same time shows the socio-genetic aspect 
producing the representations (Kalampalikis, & Apostolidis, 2020; Jodelet, 1989, 2015) for 
coping with the global crises.  
When the virus emerged in January Indonesia took the contrasting route [129]. In a bid to 
keep the economy afloat the government initially tried to deny that the virus had hit the country. 
Religious discourse formed part of the initial platform to resist the West, which intensively 
provided science-based information. Health Minister Terawan A. Putranto even said Indonesia 
owed God for protecting the whole nation from the virus [130]. The Vice President later stressed 
that every prayer read by Muslims during dawn prayers had kept the virus at bay [131]. 
When a number of cases were denied as victims of COVID-19 from the end of January to 
February, the WHO warned the Indonesian government to immediately report the real figures 
[132], as did a research team from Harvard University. The fact that the West (WHO and the 
United States) had warned Indonesia, reactivated past experience of colonial rule. Terawan 
openly revealed his resentment, saying their comments amounted to an insult to Indonesians 
[133]. Such resistance also reflects inferiority in the absence of knowledge-based arguments 
from Indonesia’s government [134].  
In the following phase, statements stressing Indonesia’s sovereignty to deal with the 
pandemic by itself referred to common sense about daily life among Indonesians. The head of 
the national COVID-19 taskforce said daily proximity with poverty, with the custom of 
consuming herbal drinks among the poor [135], could render them immune from any infection. 
However, the Vice President jokingly remarked the virus could be killed automatically by 





Dismissal of all scientific information from the West was made even clearer by the Home 
Minister, who asserted that fatalities from COVID-19 in the country were very low, and that 
Indonesians had strong physical resilience [137]. The Coordinating Maritime Affairs and 
Investment Minister added that Indonesia’s location along the equator would automatically kill 
the virus.  
By the end of February 2020, the public had developed diverse attitudes and information on 
the epidemic [138]. Amid so much denial and relaxed attitudes, a young activist and doctor used 
audio visual media to voice the need for the public to remain alert and for efforts by the state to 
avoid further deterioration [139], leading to public pressure on the government. In early March 
2020 the President announced the first confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the country [140].  
The announcement led to stigma surrounding COVID-19 and affected persons. Various 
reactions emerged [141]. Among the uneducated and lower class, who make up the nation’s 
majority, the representations expressed by authorities based on religion easily became the main 
reference point. Beyond the government, ulema (the top Muslim clerical body), celebrities and 
many other figures also played a role in the production of representations [142]. A celebrity who 
became a popular figure of the Wahabi Islamic movement even stated that COVID-19 was 
God’s warrior sent to eradicate the world’s evils. Patients then endured the double stigma of 
being afflicted by both COVID-19 and God’s punishment [143]. 
Among the upper and middle class, mastery of foreign languages enabled them to access 
abundant information from abroad, leading to a more diverse product of representation. 
However, the representation of COVID-19 being a stigma appeared stronger among them. They 
were wary of violating their social privilege of being a flawless class. Where the lower class 
whose livelihood relies on daily wages cannot stop activities to seek income, while the state 
lacks resources to meet their needs, solidarity movements soon emerged along with awareness 
among the upper middle class [144]. Representation of social identity, which clearly 
distinguishes the characteristics of the upper and lower class emerged in the statement of the 
COVID-19 national task force spokesperson, Ahmad Yurianto: “The rich protect the poor so 
they can live decently, and the poor protect the rich against catching their illness” [145].  
Such expressions also explain their insistence on rejecting scientific approaches perceived to 
originate from the West. Instead, the government provided incentives to the tourism sector, 
stating the country was safe to visit [146] (discounts of around 48% for airline tickets [147] and 
funds to influencers spreading the message that Indonesia was worthy visiting [148]). Until the 
end of March, Indonesia remained open with only limited territorial controls to prevent 
contamination. Jakarta, the capital, only applied territorial restrictions on April 6, 2020.  
It turned out that stigmatization of the virus also affected the rulers in each province [149].  
Each province controlled the number of sample tests taken, so that the figure of positive cases 
stayed low [150]: no tests, no cases [151]. The central government itself still attempted to show 
it had things under control by constantly stating that fatalities were declining [152]. 
In response to the government’s approach the public continued their customary expressions 
—satire — which under colonial rule used to appear on the stages of traditional comedy called 
ketoprak, ludruk or lenong to make fun of power (Hatley, 2008; Hefner, 1996; Peacock, 1968). 
The use of technology to produce these cultural identities shows that representations are obvious 
response to the new reality of daily lives. Memes distributed through WhatsApp groups were 
the most widely used expressions to mock conditions in the country.       
Here is an example. Following the Ramadhan fasting month in June 2020, people had been 
cooped up for months not only physically but also mentally by confusion and ignorance, so they 





justified by the common idea of the vulnerability of the virus to heat [154]. When a major 
thoroughfare in Jakarta was reopened, people came in droves cycling, violating protocols about 
physical distancing and mask-wearing [155]. A meme appeared using images of Hillary Clinton 
(H.C.) and Barack Obama (B.O.), which used cycling to mock public obliviousness about the 
danger. The dialogue goes like this: H.C.: “Do you know what Indonesians do to fight the 
coronavirus?”. B.O. “What do they do “mbak” [elder sister]?”. H.C.: “Go cycling together!”. 
B.O.: “Wkkkk… ambyar” [156]. The expression of the word ambyar is a term introduced by a 
popular pop singer who died during the pandemic, to express a state of collapse in the face of 
both helplessness and loss of control. The word thus expressed the collective sense of how 
people had to face COVID-19. The condition of ambyar was also an expression of how people 
doubted the WHO protocols, for instances in burying rituals [157]. The sense of ambyar 
therefore was the real virus faced by the nation.  
The ambyar sense of entire collapse shows us the repeated narrative among the public. In 
Javanese a term reflecting collective remorse and helplessness owing to an epidemic with 
colossal fatalities is pagebluk. This word resurfaced [158]; what was intriguing was the 
representation referring to pagebluk, which was anchored to Joyoboyo, a Javanese Nostradamus 
from the 12th century Kediri Kingdom, and how pagebluk became the common sense way of 
justifying the calamity. In this frame, we witness how people familiarize COVID-19 according 
their own knowledge repertoire. In this repertoire, they bring back memories of the earlier event 
of pagebluk — the Spanish flu, which killed almost 5 million in today’s Indonesia [159].  People 
believed that the figures of ‘twin years’ (as in 1919 and 2020) meant periods of disasters, which 
would always bring about pagebluk.  
On August 14, 2020, President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo stated that as all nations in the world 
face the pandemic in which Indonesia has again been brought to its knees, it was time to “catch 
up” [160]. The expression has developed as a jargon for over 50 years since independence, when 
Indonesians felt colonial rule had virtually submerged the nation. The positive tone in the 
expression contains a symbolic statement that will never be visible, but one that will remain the 





During phase 0, South Africans were aware of the COVID-19 virus, but engagement with 
and discourses about the virus were removed from the local context. To many South Africans, 
it was represented as a Chinese virus with the then-epicenter of the virus being the city of 
Wuhan. Citizens marveled at the speed at which China built COVID-19 hospitals overnight and 
at their lockdown response measures [161]. Messages of solidarity and support were sent to 
Wuhan including a donation of masks by the U-Mask company [162]. However, with no active 
cases in South Africa well into February 2020, it seemed highly improbable to citizens that the 
virus would hit the country’s shores [163]. In February 2020, the National Institute for 
Communicable Diseases (NICD) shared expert guidance on the response of South Africa’s 
Department of Health (DoH) to the coronavirus, stating that South Africa was prepared for the 
virus [164]. The NICD is a public health institute which provides communicable disease 
knowledge and expertise to the government, regional countries and the continent.  
During phase 0, major ports of entry were monitored, with arrivals’ temperatures screened, 
particularly focusing on monitoring arrivals from China. Then, South African government 





confirmed on 5 March 2020 [166]. The man was part of a 10-member group, which travelled to 
Italy for a skiing holiday, including his wife and eight friends, half of whom subsequently 
became COVID-19+. Citizens’ responses included outrage at the recklessness of the 10-man 
group that had travelled for leisure, despite rising global COVID-19 cases [167].  
Initial cases triggered a government response, with an emergency parliamentary debate on 
the virus held on the evening of confirmation. On 11 March 2020, five other COVID-19+ cases 
of people who had travelled to various European countries were reported, possibly fueling 
national perceptions that the virus was a disease of the white and privileged. The pandemic 
challenged individuals’ sense of continuity, disrupting ways of living between the past, present, 
and future (Murtagh et al., 2012).   
On 15 March, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa declared a state of national disaster, 
at the time with 61 confirmed cases of people infected with the virus [168]. A national 21-day 
hard lockdown at Alert Level 5 (high COVID-19 spread with a low health system readiness) 
[169] began on 27 March, lasting to 30 April 2020, closing all South African ports of entry and 
restricting movement across municipal and provincial borders. On 27 March, Health Minister 
Dr. Zweli Mkhize announced the first confirmed death in South Africa from COVID-19[170].  
Objectification, employing the use of war and other metaphors demonstrating government 
control, while fostering a sense of collective action but also justifying fighting the enemy at all 
costs (Sanderson & Meade, 2020) has been common. War and weather-related metaphors were 
used at different levels of governance, with leaders calling it an ‘invisible enemy’, urging 
citizens to use available weapons such as social distancing, wearing masks and at the peak, 
referring to the arrival of the COVID-19 storm [171]. Communication about the virus began in 
earnest with sharing the screening of arrivals at ports, and continues with televised briefings and 
DoH’s COVID-19 statistics reported daily through various media [172].  
The five lockdown levels introduced on 27 March 2020 included restriction of alcohol and 
cigarettes, regulated economic activity, limited intra- and inter-provincial travel, social 
distancing, mandatory wearing of masks in public and the imposition of curfews [173].  Apart 
from Alert level 5, others were: Alert Level 4 on 1 May 2020 (moderate to a high COVID-19 
spread with a low to moderate health system readiness); Alert Level 3 on 1 June (moderate 
COVID-19 spread with a moderate health system readiness); Alert Level 2 on 18 August 2020 
(moderate COVID-19 spread with a high health system readiness) and Alert Level 1 (low 
COVID-19 spread with a high health system readiness). 
South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world, largely along racial lines, with 
more than half of its citizens living below the food poverty line, with majority of the population 
black and most acutely affected by inequality as the poorest members of society (BusinessTech, 
2019; World Bank, 2017). “Social representations are in history and have a history” (Jodelet, 
2015, p. 9), which has been evident in the South African response to the novel virus. With the 
economy shutdown, societal inequalities that have always led a parallel socially representative 
and polyphasic existence in South Africa between privilege and poverty were exposed. 
Representations of privilege since the national lockdown have included affluent citizens 
queueing to stockpile, pushing trolleys full of groceries, alcohol and cigarettes [174], while the 
majority of people in poverty struggled to afford basics due to economic disruption. Large 
numbers of the black population stood in kilometer-long queues for food parcels and waited 
from 01:00 to 09:00 for government South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) offices to 
open in order to access R350(€17/$20) social relief of distress grants per month [175].  
Schools were closed in March 2020, however privileged private school learners continued 





scheduled to return to school by the end of August. The government’s approach of giving 
priority to saving lives is important, yet with the economy closed, as a result of the national 
shutdown, it meant that people were unable to earn a living. The South African healthcare 
system is divided along lines of affordability, with affluent citizens paying medical insurance 
(16.4%) for private healthcare facilities, while the majority use public government healthcare 
facilities (83.6%) [176] providing treatment at little to no cost. However, nationally, public 
healthcare facilities serving the majority of South Africans are overburdened, understaffed, 
unhygienic, and under-resourced, putting patients’ lives at increased risk [177]. 
Health social representation realities can best be understood through a composite 
understanding of a myriad of objects such as risk, the body, society and illness that relate to 
social representations and health (Aim et al., 2018). Since the declaration of the hard lockdown 
alert level 5, in March, 2020 and the subsequent easing through the various levels of the 
lockdown, to the announcement of Alert level 2, socio-economic inequalities have deepened. 
Cognitive polyphasia gives important insight into the ever-evolving nature of social 
communication, emotions, cognition, and reflection when people are faced with what is 
unfamiliar (de-Graft Aikins, 2012), like the novel coronavirus. This has been evident in South 
African social representations of acknowledgement that the coronavirus kills, yet believing it 
only kills people of a certain race (white) and/or age (old). 
South Africa’s five-level lockdown measures in response to positive case numbers, citizens’ 
behavior and the strain on the national health system have raised polyphasic social 
representations. Re-opening the economy, increasing economic activity, national travel, 
reopening of alcohol and cigarette sales permitted in alert level 2, in effect on 18 August 2020 
has increased fears of a surge in the number of COVID-19 cases nationally [178]. Social 
representations, from a perspective of content and process, constitute knowledge which 
manifests in everyday discourses (Moscovici, 1988) collectively produced, shared and 
participated. South Africans’ representations of the COVID-19 global pandemic remain 
polyphasic, simultaneously contradictory social representations co-existing as the government’s 





The cross-country communication overview presented in this collective work attests that in 
the representational process of the new virus, discourses from different sources, and even within 
the same source, did not converge into one representation of the disease. In the first 6-8 months 
since the outbreak began the public’s attempts to make sense of the virus, that is, to cope 
collectively with this disruptive and threatening event (Wagner et al., 2002), shifted from the 
awareness to the divergence stage and lingered on it without moving to the successive stage. 
These widely spread controversies – with different emphasis in each country depending on the 
degree of political polarization and manipulation of collective fear – have not been elaborated 
in the name of a supra-ordered good (like the interest for the well-being of the whole of 
humanity). Emblematic in this respect is the competition between super-power countries, 
evident in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of the delivery of the Sputnik 
vaccine in autumn 2020 (amidst the doubts of the international scientific community), whose 





While some of the cultural, social, and political contexts within the European space may be 
compared at some level (for instance, winning the resistance of members states ruled by 
sovereigntists; Italy, Spain, France, Germany, etc. have been very active in promoting EU's 
measures of solidarity to support the countries more affected by the virus through recovery funds 
and other economic measures), further elements of comparisons at cross-continental level can 
be observed about the Western-Eastern cultural divide, and about the activation of reversed 
majority-minority prejudice dynamics concerning white rich Europeans (identified as the source 
of the contagion) and black Africans (self-perceived as the victims of the infection).  
Besides multi-vocality and the prevalence of polemical representations –not a problem in 
itself, if recognized as a genuine expression of the pluralistic views within a democratic society 
– further commonalities surfaced.  
(a) Outgroup blaming and stigmatization implied in one of the classical explanatory patterns 
of emerging infectious disease occurred in almost all the countries/cases included in this study, 
with different and multiple targets depending on the context: especially in the early phase 
external and diverse groups were targeted, such as the Chinese (Italy, Spain, Canada), irregular 
immigrants (Italy, Malta), and then, as it became clear that everyone could be infected and infect 
others, closer groups were blamed and considered responsible for the contagion: fellow citizens 
emigrated abroad and bringing the virus ‘home’ (Romania), rich people travelling in Europe 
(South Africa, Mexico), infected people (Mexico, Indonesia, Canada), and also the health 
(Spain, Romania, Mexico) and political systems (Indonesia, Argentina). The racialization of the 
virus as ‘Chinese’ as well as ‘White European”’ (as in the South African case) or personified as 
‘the invader immigrants’ (as in the polemical representations following the increase of landings 
on the island of Lampedusa in August 2020 [180]) witnessed how the othering process is 
ubiquitous and can be reversed according to different cultural and socio-geo-political 
positioning.  
At the very beginning the Coronavirus played the role of catalyst of racism, deviating media 
attention from the traditional targets of prejudice (immigrants, Blacks, Asians, ....) to the ‘new 
invisible other’. However especially in countries where fear of the stranger has continued to be 
exploited by sovereigntist leaders for personal strategic power goals in exchange for protecting 
citizens from risks – the two media targets (i.e., the new unknown stranger COVID-19 and the 
well-known outgroups) have been associated, often denying the first one to re-focus attention 
on the traditional targets of fear and hate. Unsurprisingly the hate campaigns behind the political 
discourse on security and social control have led to the re-explosion of racial tensions and 
violence. Sen. Kamala Harris, the first black woman of Indian descent ever to be nominated as 
democratic vice-presidential candidate in US history, in her acceptance speech [181], examining 
the race dimensions of the COVID-19 burden, mentioned that a disproportionately high number 
of racial minorities were being impacted by the disease due to ‘structural racism’.“This virus 
has no eyes, and yet it knows exactly how we see each other, and how we treat each other–and 
let’s be clear: there is no vaccine for racism”[182]. 
(b) Military and naturalistic metaphors: Half an anchorage to past experiences (e.g., World 
War II), half an objectification, war language was widely used especially in countries were 
governments and political leaders acknowledged the gravity of the situation (Italy, Romania, 
Malta, Canada, South Africa) and spoke the truth to the population. More softly connoted 
naturalistic metaphors, such as the wave (Malta) and the rain (Brazil), or more catastrophic like 
the storm (South Africa) and the tsunami (Malta) were more used in countries where there were 
stark divisions within the government or where a dismissive strategy was adopted (especially 





that the diffusion of the virus is an inevitable fate, that people can only accept with resignation 
and endure with faith (if not a deserved ‘punishment of God’, as in Indonesia). 
(c) Antinomies and the social divide. The health-poverty antinomy, which in some countries 
(Italy, Malta, Canada) was explicitly evoked as a major dilemma and one of the frames for 
COVID-19 social representations, indirectly surfaced also in other countries, especially those 
characterized by pronounced social disparities and inequalities before the outbreak (Mexico, 
South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia): while health is the priority of rich people, who can afford 
lockdown measures, income is the priority of poor people, who cannot stop working if they want 
to live and support their families.  
(d) Polarization. Though not in all countries, polemical representations and multi-vocality 
were linked to political polarization (this was clearly the case of Italy, Romania, Malta and 
Brazil), leading to the circulation of opposing mutually exclusive representations that served the 
purposes of strong populist leaders all over the world. Where these processes occurred, people 
were confused and in a state of higher uncertainty, and their response to the crisis less stable and 
consistent through time. 
To conclude, polyvocality and cognitive polyphasia characterized COVID-19-related 
communication in all the countries considered, highlighting divergences among political 
leaders, among experts, between lay people and experts, between media and governments, and 
between the poor and the rich. Multi-vocality is built-in to consensual universes, yet in this 
pandemic crisis it seemed also to affect expert knowledge and above all the institutional 
leaderships. Divergences in the representations aligned with different responses to the epidemic, 
both at the macro- and micro-level, that is both in policy and in citizens’ everyday life. The 
landscape of such polyvocality changed in time and place as countries went through the different 
phases of the outbreak, and it is bound to change further as long as the outbreak continues to 
spread. Transversal polarised representations - across different countries and continents - can be 
found in the opposition between those leaders and experts who are seriously concerned about 
the risks (both for citizens' health and the consequences of restrictions on all aspects of the socio-
economic life) and the ‘COVID-19 deniers’, who label the scientists advising the governments 
about the pandemic risk of contagion and its potential new waves as ‘alarmists’.   
Exemplary were the positions from the two sides of the Atlantic: President Donald Trump in 
the USA, who addressed Dr. Anthony Fauci, the nation’s top infectious disease expert and head 
of the White House coronavirus task force, “a bit of an alarmist” [183]; President Bolsonaro in 
Brazil, who provoked the recurrent dismissal of the Ministries of Health; President Andres 
Manuel Lopez Obrador in Mexico; Prime Minister Boris Johnson in the UK, who for a long 
time did not follow experts' advice either for the population's safety or for himself, until he was 
personally infected (like Bolsonaro across the Ocean); the leader of the right-wing League party 
Matteo Salvini in Italy, against the government measures; Prime Minister Abela in Malta, who 
fought against Minister of Health Fearne for the leadership within the  Labour Party (just to 
mention some countries under scrutiny among others). 
An echo chamber effect of such paradoxical communication was also evident in the ‘anti-
mask’ protests by COVID deniers organized on 29 August 2020 in many EU capitals, including 
London, Zurich, Paris and Berlin (here also showing symbols of the Nazi far-right), driven by 
the conspiracy theory of COVID as the invention of corrupt authoritarian politicians to deprive 
citizens of their freedom and control them [184]. 
The lack of a shared image and a hegemonic social representation has not facilitated 





prevention measures (masks, physical distancing, and hand washing), with the consequence of 





The exploration of the social representations of COVID-19 in public communication across 
10 countries from Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia and Africa has helped to shed 
light on social behavior, highlighting the connection between the interpretative patterns of the 
pandemic and outgroup blaming, political polarization, and noncompliance with emergency 
measures.  
All studies have weaknesses, and ours is no exception. Specifically, methodological 
limitations should be mentioned: countries/cases were selected based on the collaborative 
resources that it was possible to locate through available research networks, though we had to 
waive the inclusion of some interesting countries. However, respecting the different times in 
which they were affected by the contagion resulted in different time coverage of public 
communication in each country; the specificity of each country resulted in a partly different 
selection of sources, both in number and type. Moreover, using salience as the key parameter 
for selecting texts may have resulted in omitting other relevant information. We acknowledge 
that country-based case studies are particularly complex, since they combine an analysis of the 
social and political context with the analysis of the specific communicative texts selected for 
the purpose of this study: time constraints may have limited the comprehensiveness of the 
analysis. 
Two main practical implications can be drawn from this study, aimed at improving public 
communication in crisis management: the importance of containing polarized information and 
opposing misinformation. 
Polarized information, that is, controversial messages from different sources, or even within 
the same source (e.g., politicians or scientists endorsing contradictory measures and 
recommendations), lead people to draw different conclusions about the threat and how to 
respond to it. Perceived political polarization enhances the perception that the institutions’ 
response to COVID-19 is chaotic and disorganized. Moreover, polarized information triggers 
affective responses that decrease social trust (Hetherington & Weiler, 2015) and increase 
defense mechanisms that give rise to derogatory representations of ‘others’. Research has 
shown that institutional leaders who engage in bipartisan arguments can help reduce 
polarization (Bolsen et al., 2014), and this may help people and communities to endorse 
COVID-19-related measures. 
In the same vein, the persistence of inflamed multi-vocality and mutually exclusive 
representations of the pandemic are likely – either involuntarily or intentionally – to promote 
misinformation and fake news, including support for lay explanatory patterns of the epidemic 
that stigmatize outgroups and related conspiracy theories. Misinformation should be 
counteracted especially because of its detrimental consequences on social behavior (Larson, 
2018; Marshall, 2017; van Bavel et al., 2020), for instance leading people to self- and other-
harming actions such as – in the pandemic situation – refusing protection, hyper-protecting 






While suggestions from mainstream social psychology research aimed at preventing 
polarization and misinformation are mainly based on an individualistic-rationalistic micro-
paradigm, our findings inspired by the supra-disciplinary vision of the social representations 
theory suggest that effective public communication cannot neglect collective symbolic coping, 
and that it would greatly benefit from the knowledge of the psychosocial processes underlying 
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